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The SED leadership had a whole arsenal of weapons of coercion at its disposal, which were 
regularly used on those young people who were seen to be straying from the path set out for 
them by the Party. In schools and on the streets, instances of indiscipline and unruliness were 
routinely interpreted by the authorities as “attacks on the state”. The regime’s need to 
generate rituals and proofs of loyalty led to repression against individuals when they failed to 
live up to its expectations. It claimed to have a monopoly on youth and the power to mould 
young people as future citizens. Youth was prized as a particularly creative and malleable 
part of the population. Being put on a pedestal like this was flattering but also dangerous for 
teenagers.  
 
In addition to this background level of repression of nonconformity, there were periodic 
campaigns of persecution directed at particular groups. In the early 1950s, the major focus 
was on young Christians, who belonged to the Junge Gemeinde, particularly in the 
Oberschulen.1 With the emergence of recognisable youth subcultures (first Bebop fans then 
rockers) in the early-to-mid-1950s, the Party was provided with new and highly visible 
targets for public condemnation and official harassment. This article explores the influence of 
Stalinism on the Party and assesses whether the methods used by the SED, in its bid to coerce 
                                            
1 Dorothee Wierling, “Die Jugend als innerer Feind. Konflikte in der Erziehungsdiktatur der sechziger Jahre”. 
In: Hartmut Kaelbe/Jürgen Kocka/Hartmut Zwahr (Eds), Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 404–
425, here 407. 
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young people into conformity, really were “just like the Nazis”. It also raises the issue of 
“moral panics”, which were neither wholly Stalinist nor Nazi in origin, and which constituted 
the prevalent mode of misrepresenting and attacking youth subcultures in both East and West. 
While recognizing that the GDR was a dictatorship, which sought to exert a total claim on the 
population, it is also important to assess the areas where supposedly “common sense”, 
authoritarian responses to youth deviance also existed in liberal democracies.2 The GDR did 
not have a monopoly on conservatives who feared youthful exuberance and nonconformity. 
 
STALINIST OVERTONES 
 
Particularly in the early years of the regime’s existence, while Stalin was still in power in the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet occupying forces continued to play a crucial role in shaping and 
influencing the development of socialism in the GDR, regime attempts to punish and control 
youth nonconformity could be described as “Stalinist” in their language and methodology.3 
Recurrent themes in the Stalinist-style rhetoric involved “infiltration” and “sabotage” by 
spies and traitors, together with the work of the counter-revolutionary fifth column. The cold 
war was real enough, but fear of western contamination developed into a form of paranoia. 
According to this mind-set, attacks on the GDR came from a bewilderingly wide range of 
sources, but were all connected in a concerted, covert onslaught, orchestrated by western 
agencies. At this time, the GDR heavily borrowed political rituals and ceremonies from the 
                                            
2 In the mid-1950s, British Home Secretary R. A. Butler announced the hasty construction of Detention Centres 
for juveniles: „Everything should be done at the double… there should be a maximum of hard work and a 
minimum of amusement.“ Geoffrey Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears, New York 1984, p. 13. 
3 Ian Kershaw/Moshe Lewin (Eds.), Stalinism and Nazism: dictatorships in comparison, Cambridge 1997; 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalinism: a reader, London/New York, 1999. 
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Soviet „big brothers”.4 The October Revolution and Soviet victory against National Socialism 
were seen as major sources of legitimacy. Adopting Soviet rituals and rhetoric was a way of 
establishing one’s loyalty and disguising any continuities with the Third Reich. 
 
To a much greater extent than for subsequent Soviet leaders, attempts were made to 
generate a cult of personality for Stalin among East German youth. In the run up to Christmas 
1949, Communists in the education ministry and the FDJ tried to have the traditional 
Christian emphasis on the 25 December, as a celebration of the nativity of Christ, replaced 
with a commemoration, instead, of Stalin’s birth which fell on the 21 December.5 Not 
surprisingly, this attempt to substitute a popular festival traditionally accompanied with 
eating, drinking and making merry with a dour celebration of the anniversary of a man 
responsible for the deaths and disappearance of millions of people (including hundreds of 
thousands of their fellow countrymen in the postwar period) was more than many young 
people could stomach. Nevertheless, the authorities were determined to punish any young 
person who failed to show the requisite degree of solemnity and respect during these birthday 
celebrations. A group of sixth formers in Dresden used the occasion to make an ironic protest 
against the regime. They celebrated Stalin’s birth with not one but three portraits and hung up 
the ironic slogan „Stalin, der Genius der Menschheit!”6 
 
                                            
4 Jürgen Danyel, “Politische Rituale als Sowjetimporte”. In: Konrad Jarausch/Hannes Siegrist (Eds.), 
Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland, 1945-1970, Frankfurt/New York 1997, pp. 67-86, here 
70. 
5 Joachim Petzold, Zum Verhältnis zwischen FDJ und Junger Gemeinde bis 1953. In: Helga Gotschlich (Ed.), 
“Links und links und Schritt gehalten...”. Die FDJ: Konzepte - Abläufe – Grenzen, Berlin 1994, pp. 127-140, p. 
134. 
6 Ibid., p.135. 
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Anything short of complete enthusiasm for Soviet-style Communism and Stalin posed a 
threat of disloyalty to the Party. Fresh from a trip to Moscow, in December 1949, after being 
demoted, Horst Sindermann outlined the groups that he held responsible for slowing down 
the development and take up of socialism in the eastern Zone. Leipzig, once proclaimed as 
the birthplace of Social Democracy, was now denigrated as „die Hochburg der 
Schumacherideologie”, a city tainted with its long tradition of „Revisionismus”.7 Just three 
years after the forced merger of the SPD with the KPD and only two months after the 
founding of the GDR, Sindermann warned of the dangerous existence of „kleinbürgerlichen 
Schumacherischer Tendenz” in the Leipzig teaching profession „auch unter den Lehrern, die 
Genossen unserer Partei sind”. The teacher’s union, in particular, represented „das Zentrum 
dieser Rückständigkeit“ in Leipzig. For Sindermann, there was only one option: „Wir müssen 
mutig und kühn die feindlichen Agenturen und ihre Nester aufstöbern, sie zerschlagen und sie 
vor der Mitgliedschaft und der gesamten Bevölkerung als Zentralen der feindlichen 
englisch-amerikanischen Monopolkapitals entlarven.“8 
 
In the immediate postwar period, the Communists had sought to establish their credentials 
as open and accepting democrats. The early inclusiveness was now jettisoned in favour of 
sectarianism, uniformity and repression. Attacks on Liberals and Social Democrats within the 
teaching profession coincided with the arrest and imprisonment of pupils in the Oberschulen 
for minor acts of disobedience and nonconformity. Together, teachers and “bourgeois, middle 
class” pupils were supposedly colluding in hampering the development of socialism and the 
                                            
7 West German Social Democratic leader, Kurt Schumacher, had strongly opposed the merger of the SPD with 
the KPD in the Soviet zone. 
8 Referat des neuen Kreisvorsitzenden der SED, Horst Sindermann auf der Stadtdelegierten-Konferenz Leipzig 
am 1. und 2 Dezember 1949 (Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leipzig, IV-5/01/003). 
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correct class consciousness among young people. In a general atmosphere of fear and 
confusion, purges and show trials were implemented by the Ministries of State Security and 
Justice, without key members of the administration, like Otto Grotewohl, being informed. At 
the beginning of October 1951, Prime Minister Grotewohl was presented with a copy of a 
West Berlin newspaper. From it, he learned that on the 3 October 1951 a political trial was 
due to take place against 19 Oberschüler from Werdau before the district court in Zwickau. 
The article reckoned that the pupils would be given long sentences. It further predicted that 
only members of Communist organizations would be allowed to observe the proceedings.9 
Grotewohl asked the Justice Ministry to delay or abandon the trial, but by the time a 
representative had been sent to Zwickau, sentences of between two and fifteen years had 
already been passed down. In fact, just after midnight on the night of the 3-4 October, the 
nineteen Oberschüler were sentenced to a total of 130 years in prison. Their crime had been 
to distribute leaflets criticising the undemocratic nature of the so-called „People’s Elections”. 
They had further denounced the decision of the „unelected Pankow regime” to condemn an 
Oberschüler to death for distributing other anti-regime leaflets.10 
 
Interestingly, the way in which the MfS had carried out this and other trials against 
Oberschüler in Saxony had produced „strong opposition” not just among the general 
population but even within „our government and the Politbüro”. The „opposition” on the part 
of regime leaders stemmed not so much from the fact that the trials and the sentences handed 
                                            
9 Vertraulich! Nicht in den Geschäftsgang geben! Bericht: Prozeß gegen 19 Werdauer Oberschüler am 
3.10.1951 (BArch. SAPMO DY30/IV2/905/42). 
10 For a full account of the trial by one of those accused, see Achim Beyer, Der Prozeß gegen die “Werdauer 
Oberschüler” 1951. Jugendwiderstand in der SBZ/DDR. In: Deutschland Archiv, 31:1 (1998), pp. 86-97. The 
regime saw the death sentence as legitimate because the pupil (Hermann Flade) had resisted his arrest with a 
pocket knife. However, under international pressure, they later commuted it. 
6 
 
down were patently unjust and excessive, but because their lack of information about the 
trials made it impossible for Party functionaries to „prepare and carry out the necessary 
political steering”. News of the trial had spread, via western press reports and RIAS 
broadcasts, to Werdau, described as „a centre of sectarianism”, and Crimmitschau, dubbed „a 
stronghold of Social Democracy”.11 
 
The „Stalinist” character of these early assaults against groups of young people defined 
and labelled as nonconformist by the authorities, was particularly apparent in the offensive 
against the Junge Gemeinde carried out in the Spring of 1953. Combining high-profile 
denunciation in the media with a carefully orchestrated series of show trials and public purges 
in the Oberschulen, the campaign was designed to strike terror into the hearts of young 
Christians and to show them that the regime meant business.12 As Erich Honecker put it in 
instructions to his FDJ troops: „Deshalb sind in Verbindung mit der breitesten 
Aufklärungsarbeit unter der Jugend und Bevölkerung alle Massnahmen zu treffen… in Bezug 
auf die Reinigung der Oberschulen und Universitäten… Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass bei 
einer entsprechenden Aufklärungsarbeit in kurzer Zeit das von uns gesteckte Ziel der 
Liquidierung der Jungen Gemeinde erreicht werden kann.“13 The Communist leadership 
suspected that middle-class and Christian Oberschüler were behind the poor performance of 
working-class youth in education and the lacklustre activities of the FDJ. In rural 
communities, in particular, the FDJ was failing to compete effectively with the much more 
                                            
11 Prozeß gegen 19 Werdauer. 
12 Politbüro Protokoll Nr. 5/53 v. 27. Jan. 1953 (BArch SAPMO, JIV2/2–259). 
13 Fernschreiben an der 1. Sekretäre der Bezirksleitungen der Freien Deutschen Jugend, April 1953 (BArch 
SAPMO DY24/11.895, pp. 40-41). 
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popular Junge Gemeinde. A report from Flöha outlined the dangerous threat posed by this 
organization of young Christians: 
 
Die Mitglieder der FDJ gehen nicht in die Heimabende, sondern zu dieser 
christlichen Jugend.  Es gibt dort Mitgliedskarten.  Die Abende finden in 
Privatwohnungen statt.  Sie lassen sich nie in Diskussionen (politische) ein.  
Sind bereit, mit der FDJ zusammenzuarbeiten, lehnen aber jeden 
Zusammenschluss ab.  Man spricht über Goethe, Heine und singt kirchliche 
Lieder, sobald aber ein Fremder mitkommt, bleibt man heilig.14 
 
Other local FDJ commanders reported the opposite. Christians used innocent-seeming leisure 
opportunities as a means of talking young atheists into abandoning their secular beliefs and 
becoming Christians. 
 
In fact, many Christians were members of both organizations and those people who were 
keenly involved in Junge Gemeinde activities were often also functionaries in the FDJ. 
Unfortunately, this only hardened the leadership’s suspicions by suggesting that young 
Christians were deliberately infiltrating the youth organization in order to subvert and 
undermine it from within. Christian function-holders in the FDJ were accused of throwing a 
spanner in the works by deliberately making FDJ activities dull and uninteresting. The fact 
that convinced atheists were just as likely to hold tedious and unimaginative FDJ meetings 
was not enough to prevent the authorities embarking on a full-scale purge in which members 
of the youth organization were required to surrender their membership cards. The attack on 
Christian infiltration of the youth organization was pushed forward as if it was a real purge.  
                                            
14 Vertraulich! Abschrift der Berichte aus den Kreisen, No date, ca. 1947 (BArch SAPMO DY24/3817). 
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Christians who had insinuated their way into the youth organization were „exposed” and 
incriminated.15 Local functionaries transformed routine and humdrum youth club activities 
into the work of „spies“, „agents” and „traitors”. 
 
The campaign against the Junge Gemeinde also represented the SED’s first use of mass 
media in a campaign against a section of youth. In the West, tabloids routinely trade in lies 
and innuendo. They stretch the truth and make the evidence fit their particular agenda. 
Opponents are easily smeared and maligned. In April 1953, young Christians had organized a 
retreat in Sehlis, a small village on the outskirts of Leipzig. In its report on this supposed 
„Lager“, the Leipziger Volkszeitung used all its powers of misrepresentation and insinuation.16 
The article gives an example of the type of inflammatory and muckraking rhetoric the Party 
used against the Junge Gemeinde. The headline ran „‘Junge Gemeinde’ – Tarnorganisation im 
USA-Auftrag“. The newspaper outlined „Wie junge Menschen unter Mißbrauch religiöser 
Gefühle zu Verbrechern aufgewiegelt werden.“ Other examples of the Junge Gemeinde’s 
misdeeds were summarized under subheadings which sounded more like the titles of trash 
novels: „Agenten und Provokateure im Priesterrock“, „The SS Death’s head was the symbol“ 
and „Fascist songbooks for ,spiritual edification,”. 
 
The Junge Gemeinde was said to be controlled by the CIA and was an extension of „the 
fascist terror organization, the BDJ“.17 Needless to say, the BDJ (a West German neo-Nazi 
youth organization using the name Bündische Jugend) had no connections whatever with the 
                                            
15 Eye-witness accounts of how the purges were experienced are given in Patrik von zur Mühlen, Der 
“Eisenberger Kreis” Jugendwiderstand und Verfolgung in der DDR, 1953-1958, Bonn 1995, pp. 27-28. 
16 “Junge Gemeinde” – Tarnorganisation im USA-Auftrag. In: Leipziger Volkszeitung 19.4.1953. 
17 Ibid. Cf. Faschistische Umtriebe des “BDJ” unter dem Deckmantel der illegalen “Jungen Gemeinde”. In: 
Neues Deutschland 28.4.1953. 
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Junge Gemeinde. The important thing was to build up a composite web of attributions so that 
young people could be judged guilty by association. The „evidence“ for the accusations of 
pro-fascism came in the form of a photograph purportedly showing a death’s head symbol. 
The paper accused the Christians of secretly painting „SS death’s heads“ and thereby 
revealing a murderous intent. Most of the information contained in the article was pure 
fantasy. This sinister and shadowy young Christian organization incited its members to 
commit hostile acts against the state and tried to embark them on careers in crime. Their 
ostensible religious activity was merely a cloak for „banditry“. In reality, the paper suggested, 
they were part of the network of agents and subversives under American secret service 
control. All this „confirmed“ that the Junge Gemeinde was no religious community, but an 
illegal terror organization. 
 
The reporters supposedly found a dummy hanging from a tree with a red tie around its 
neck. This was interpreted as a symbolic hanging and stood in stark contrast to the professed 
religious activity. Such an outrageous provocation was linked the Klu Klux Klan, and the 
brutal terror practised by „Ami-soldiers in Korea“. A single, symbolic tie was enough to 
condemn the young Christians as being CIA agents. Their place of retreat was now a „nesting 
place“ for the GDR’s sworn enemies. These young people were merely disguised as 
Christians; behind their outward profession of faith, they practised hatred for progressives 
rather than brotherly love. The journalists happily embraced their role as smearers and 
defamers. Their campaign acted as the starting pistol for a wave of condemnation and attacks 
at the grass roots; the Junge Gemeinde could now be unmasked. CDU member Manfred 
Klein subsequently suggested that the uniforms and ideological training of the FDJ had 
proved „psychologically effective“ in creating and heightening divisions between „us“ and 
10 
 
„them“.18 Some of the young people, who had been young children during the Third Reich, 
embraced the new opportunities for persecuting a visible minority. The regime encouraged 
them to act out as bullies; it allowed opportunities for ventilating grudges and settling scores. 
After the first article against the Junge Gemeinde was published in the January edition of 
Junge Welt, one young FDJ member (who had supposedly previously also once been a 
member of the Junge Gemeinde) wrote to in to say that „Diese Menschen können unserer 
Republik nur schaden. Es sind feindliche Elemente, die sich hinter einer Maske verbergen 
und entlarvt und vernichtet werden müssen.“19  
 
The violence of the language is interesting on a psychological level. As Adorno argued in 
1959, many Germans were „indifferent to democracy, where they don’t secretly hate it“.20 
Elizabeth Ten Dyke argues that „Many characteristics of the authoritarian personality Adorno 
described seem to apply to East Germans. These include a weak ego, rigidity, conformism, 
conventionality, and the penchant to subordinate one’s self to larger groups.“21 While 
sweeping claims about „deformed personalities“ are problematic, the evidence suggests that 
the lessons from the Nazi past had not been learnt by many conformist East Germans in early 
1953. The linguist Victor Klemperer recorded how Nazism had polluted language and 
thinking in Germany and persisted after the foundation of the GDR.22 In June 1953, East 
                                            
18 Manfred Klein, Jugend zwischen den Diktaturen: 1945-1956, Mainz 1968, p. 79. 
19 VEB Kombinat “Otto Grotewohl”, Jan 1953 (BArch SAPMO DY24/11.895). 
20 Theodor W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, New York 1950; Idem., What does Coming to Terms 
with the Past Mean? In: Timothy Bahti/Geoffrey Hartman (Eds.), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, 
Bloomington 1986, pp. 114-129, here 125. The essay was originally published in 1959. 
21 Elizabeth Ten Dyke, Dresden: Paradoxes of Memory in History, New York/London 2001, p. 48. 
22 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich, translated by Martin Brady, London/New York 2000, p. 
2. 
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Germans rose up en masse in favour of democracy. The Communist authorities insisted that 
there were National Socialist elements to the anti-Communist fury, but they were forced to 
backtrack from their repressive course. Even after the campaign against the Junge Gemeinde 
was called off (under pressure from the Soviets following Stalin’s death), there were reports 
of residual hostility to the Christians: „aus dem Bezirk Leipzig wir die Tendenz vertreten, ‘na 
lass die ‘Junge Gemeinde‘ nur kommen, nachher machen wir eine Politik, da werden sie alle 
wieder hinausekeln.” One young „youth friend“ was particularly upset by the sudden U-turn: 
„Ich habe mitgestimmt, dass die Mitglieder der ‘Jungen Gemeinde‘ von der Oberschule 
verwiesen werden und jetzt soll ich mit diesen auf einer Schulbank sitzen, das mache ich 
nicht mit.“23 
 
NAZI OVERTONES 
 
As sociologist Stanley Cohen suggested in his important work on „folk devils and moral 
panics“ in Britain, „the process of spurious attribution is not, of course, random. The audience 
has existing stereotypes of other folk devils to draw upon and, as with racial stereotyping, 
there is a readily available composite image which the new picture can be grafted on to.“24 
Unfortunately, for the SED, the bank of existing popular stereotypes had already been 
exploited and plundered by the Nazis. As a result, in trying to whip up „moral panics“ about 
young people, the Communists had little choice but to re-use labels and images already shop-
soiled and over-utilised by their ideological enemies. Consequently, certain aspects of the 
campaign of vilification and public humiliation against the Junge Gemeinde bore more 
                                            
23 Information Nr. 4 über die Stimmung und Argumentation zum Kommunique des Politbüros des 
Zentralkomitees der SED, 15.6.1953 (BArch SAPMO, DY24/2301). 
24 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The creation of the Mods and the Rockers, London 1972, p. 56. 
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resemblance to Nazi attacks on „community aliens“ than Soviet-style show trials. In addition 
to being accused of being fascist, racist and criminal, members of the Junge Gemeinde were 
also charged with being dirty, unhygienic and potentially sexually deviant. The aim was not 
just to marginalize and persecute young Christians, but to shame them by tarnishing their 
respectability. 
 
Problematic for the SED leadership was the fact that although seeming completely normal 
and second-nature to them, the Stalinist use of purges was deeply upsetting to a population 
which had just been through twelve years of National Socialist dictatorship. Although the 
campaign against the Junge Gemeinde was clearly Stalinist in conception, in its concrete 
implementation it reminded many people of the excesses of National Socialism. Thus parents 
of pupils purged from the Oberschule in Pößneck complained to Wilhelm Pieck of the 
„Gestapo methods“ employed by the local FDJ secretary – in keeping a little black book with 
the names of young people he suspected of being Christian.25 The language of „national 
community“ was also apparent in the aftermath of the June 17th uprising, when young people 
involved in subcultures were singled out for punishment and blame. Juxtaposing popular folk 
traditions familiar to older generations („our good old folk songs“) with the new and alien 
fashions among youth, the authorities sought to scapegoat gang members for the uprising and 
drive a wedge between them and the rest of the working-class community. The authorities 
printed mugshots of young people who had been involved and asked the population to judge 
for themselves.26 
 
                                            
25 Ministerium für Volksbildung: Lage in Gera, June 1953 (BArch Berlin, DR2/4899, p. 63). 
26 Urteilt selbst! In: Leipziger Volkszeitung, 24.6.1953, p. 3. 
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Far from shying away from the label of being „just like the Nazis“, at times the German 
Communists went out of their way to pursue policies and methods which were very similar to 
those the Nazis had used in their own attacks on nonconformity and deviance.27 The Nazis 
had been plagued by a range of youth subcultural cliques like the Edelweiss Pirates and the 
Leipziger Meuten.28 Although there is little evidence of direct crossovers or a continuous 
existence during the late 1940s, the „packs“ were back on the streets of central Leipzig in the 
early 1950s. These gangs were an odd hybrid of overlapping cultural elements. Many of the 
youngsters (mostly young men), who clustered on the street corners and in front of the 
cinemas, were working class. Like their predecessors, they were macho and territorial, but 
they were now also heavily influenced in their choice of music and fashion by the example of 
Halbstarken culture and Rock „n“ roll spreading from the West.29 It was relatively easy in the 
1950s (compared to the situation after the wall was built) for young people to travel to West 
Berlin and get hold of jeans and leather jackets. They could also visit the cinemas and buy 
comic books, records and trash literature. Stations like RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) 
and AFN (American Forces Network) helped to spread the raucous and supposedly inflaming 
                                            
27 Detlev J. K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: conformity, opposition and racism in everyday life, London 1987, 
p. 168. One key way the Nazis differed was in imposing forced sterilizations. Oded Heilbronner, From a Culture 
for Youth to a Culture of Youth: Recent Trends in the Historiography of Western Youth Cultures. In: 
Contemporary European History, 17:4 (Nov. 2008), pp. 575-591, p. 583. 
28 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, p. 165f.; Alexander Lange, Meuten, Broadway-Cliquen, Junge Garde: 
Leipziger Jugendgruppen im Dritten Reich, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2010. 
29 Wiebke Janssen, Halbstarke in der DDR: Verfolgung und Kriminalisierung einer Jugendkultur, Berlin 2010. 
Cf. Mark Fenemore, Die anderen Leipziger Meuten: Halbstarke und Beatfans in Leipzig. In: Leonard 
Schmieding/Alfons Kenkmann (Eds.), Kohte, Kanu, Kino und Kassette: Jugend zwischen Wilhelm II. und 
Wiedervereinigung, Leipzig 2012, pp. 121-140. 
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new music. Elvis and Little Richard provided the soundtrack to new forms of youthful 
rebellion „Made in the GDR“. 
 
The way in which the SED responded to these new gangs was to use overt intimidation, 
violence and humiliation. The act of tuning in to Western radio was arbitrarily condemned as 
being „hostile to the state“. Particularly in the 1950s, the regime was prepared to sanction and 
encourage the use of violence against young people who visibly deviated from party-imposed 
norms. Thus, youth club leaders were admonished for shying away from „talking with their 
fists”. Local party officials were quite ready to sanction violence – at least in the form of 
punches and kicks – in their quest to deal with nonconformist behaviour.30 Brute force and 
intimidation were frequently encouraged as means of dealing with problem youth. The 
People’s Police could therefore feel justly proud of themselves for putting gang members in 
hospital. 
 
Zur endgültigen Beseitigung der Pressley-Bande [sic] hatte folgender 
Vorfall beigetragen: Als die Bande sich Ende Oktober 1958 wieder auf dem 
Fussweg breitmachtet, wurde sie von einer Anzahl Bürger derartig 
verdroschen, dass einige sich in ärztlicher Behandlung begeben mussten… 
Durch diese “Selbsthilfe” der Bürger wurde gleichzeitig die sogen. 42er 
Bande aufgelöst.31 
 
                                            
30 Protokoll des Berichtes über die Arbeit im Klubhaus Erich Zeigner am 18.9.1953, 3.2.1954 (StAL 
IV5/01/483). 
31 BDVP: Bericht über die Presley und 42er Bande, 10.12.1958 (StAL BDVP 24/113, 90). 
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By „self-help”, they meant Stasi-orchestrated intimidation and violence. In unconscious 
emulation of the Nazis, the SED sought to institutionalize this everyday threat of beatings 
against young people who failed to conform by creating paramilitary „order groups” 
(Ordnungsgruppen) with a remit to pressure and intimidate the gangs into submission.32 
 
Ziel dieser Ordnungsgruppen ist, an Brennpunkten innerhalb der Jugend 
zum Einsatz zu kommen mit dem Inhalt, Verbindungen zu diesen negativen 
Teilen der Jugendlichen herzustellen, Einfluß auf sie zu gewinnen und sie – 
wenn irgend möglich – an die FDJ-Arbeit bzw. gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit 
heranzuführen.33 
 
As helpers of the state and security organs of the GDR, the Order Groups had the task of 
ensuring the maintenance of internal order and security. For many young people, however, 
the Order Groups were little more than “organisierte FDJ-Banden”.34 Although a nice idea in 
theory, it proved difficult in practice to find sufficient numbers of young people who were 
both ideologically committed and foolhardy enough to be prepared to engage in unarmed 
combat with the gangs. As one young man put it, „Wir lassen uns doch nicht von den 
Rowdies zusammenschlagen. Einige andere machen die Erklärung ihrer Bereitschaft von der 
Zusicherung abhängig, daß sie nicht mit bloßen Händen die Auseinandersetzung mit Rowdies 
führen müßten und stellen die Frage, ob sie Gummiknüppel oder Pistolen erhalten.“35 
                                            
32 Michael Walter, Die Freie Deutsche Jugend: ihre Funktionen im politischen System der DDR, Freiburg 1997, 
pp. 151-159. 
33 Der Kampf gegen Jugendkriminalität und Rowdytum im Bezirk Leipzig, no date, ca. 1960 (StAL, BDVP 
24/113, pp. 213-242, here 229). 
34 Einsatz an den erw. Oberschulen, 19.10.1961 (BArch. DR2/6298, 84). 
35 Durchführung des Beschlusses des Sekretariats der Bezirksleitung "Zu einigen Fragen der Jugendarbeit und 
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Although they could be brought in as a conspicuous and muscular presence at political 
meetings and on the door at discothèques, out on the street they were in enemy territory. 
There, their uniforms and kung-fu training were hopelessly unequal to the hit-and-run 
guerrilla-warfare tactics of the gangs, whose rules of engagement owed little to the Marquis 
of Queensberry. Nevertheless, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 allowed the 
regime to come down hard on nonconformists. It loudly announced that order groups were to 
be formed throughout the republic. Their re-introduction was part of a raft of repressive 
measures designed to tackle youth nonconformity, including the introduction of military 
service for all young men and the erection of special punishment camps for the ‘re-education’ 
of “work-shy youth”.36 Overall, it was proposed to create 4,000 new order groups with a total 
membership of 30,000 “to tackle the persistence of capitalist Unmoral among young people. 
They were to receive pre-military training for their ‘Kampf gegen Rowdys, kriminelle 
Elemente, Spekulanten… [und] Handlanger des Klassengegners”.37 One of the first tasks 
given to the order groups was the implementation of a campaign entitled ‘Blitz against 
NATO senders’ designed to “encourage” the population to turn their aerials around and stop 
receiving radio and television from the West. In a move described as “Nazi” and “medieval” 
by spectators, the regime tried to use young people as shock troops in its war against Western 
media infiltration.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
dem Auftreten der Rowdygruppen", 13.10.1965 (StAL IVA-5/01/269, p. 226). 
36 Beschluß [des Sekretariats des ZR der FDJ] über die Ordnungsgruppen der FDJ, 22.8.1961 (BArch. SAPMO, 
DY24/3753-I); Analyse der Entwicklung der Jugendkriminalität im Bezirk Leipzig, 1962 (StAL BDVP 
24.1/420, pp. 85-86). 
37 Amt für Jugendfragen Protokoll, 13.9.1961 (BArch. SAPMO DY6/3937; StAL, BDVP 24/113, pp. 97-98). 
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The renewed offensive against Western nonculture combined denunciation with 
intimidation. Coming as it did only a week after the building of the Berlin wall, the drive to 
clean up the airwaves received mainly lacklustre responses from FDJler with comments like 
“Wir wollen es doch nicht wie die Nazis machen und an den Tören horchen” and “wir haben 
in dieser Woche genug für die FDJ gemacht.”38 Parents, too, were less than sympathetic to an 
attempt to use their children as enforcers of regime policy. One young man remembered his 
father telling him that if he touched the aerial, then he would have no hesitation in throwing 
him off the roof.39 Nevertheless, some areas saw young pioneers being sent round to pin 
donkey’s ears to the doors of people whose aerials still pointed to the West.40 
 
Although, again under Soviet pressure, the campaign was soon called off, interviewees 
remembered growing up with the knowledge that they could get themselves and their parents 
into serious trouble if they were found out and denounced for tuning in to Western stations.41 
The Communists’ hostility to Western media was persistently seen in the light of the Nazis’ 
attempts to prevent the population from listening to alternatives to official indoctrination and 
propaganda. After his arrest for counter-revolutionary opposition, Hans-Peter D., 
remembered being asked what radio stations he received. After trotting out the usual – Radio 
                                            
38 Bericht über den Einsatz am 3. und 4. Oktober 1961 in Leipzig (BArch. Berlin, DR2/6956, 27); Ergebnisse im 
Zusammenhang der Regierungsmaßnahmen, 13.8.61 (StAL, BDVP 24.1/201, p. 63; StAL, FDJ Bezirksleitung 
Leipzig 82, Box Nr. 79). 
39 Interview with Wolfgang F. 
40 Genossen Kurt Hager, Volksbildung: Information über die politischen Auseinandersetzungen mit Lehrern, 
Eltern und Schülern gegen den Empfang von Westsendern, 4.10.1961 (BArch. SAPMO DY30/ IV2/905/27, pp. 
26-31). 
41 Interview with Dieter L. 
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Luxembourg, RIAS and AFN – he was asked if there were any more. “Yes”, he replied, “the 
BBC and Radio Moscow.”42  
 
Within institutions for juvenile offenders, a harsh and brutal regime was encouraged. 
 
Am 24.8.61 wurden zwei Strafgefangenen vor ihrem Einschluß in die 
Station I grundlos mit einigen Fußtritten, Beinstellen und einer Ohrfeige 
behandelt.  Auf anschließender Frage warum dieses geschehen sei, wurde 
geantwortet, daß Strafg. sich geäußert hätten, die Arreststation wäre für sie 
nur eine Erholung.43 
 
Although on this occasion they were reproached by the authorities, mistreatment of young 
offenders (political or otherwise) by prison guards was routine. In addition to the officially 
meted-out punishments, there was the everyday harassment and ever-present drill.44 Young 
offenders institutes, like the notorious Jugendwerkhof Torgau, were run in accordance with 
Prussian traditions of military discipline. Much of the daily routine consisted of compulsory 
sport (Zwangssport), designed to push inmates to the limits of physical exhaustion, together 
with punishing cleaning details.45 Those arrested by the Stasi remember routinely being 
deprived of food, being forced to stand with their noses to the wall for hours on end and 
                                            
42 Interview with Hans-Peter D. 
43 Bericht über den praktischen Einsatz des Offizierlehrganges (SV) vom 24.8.1961 bis 26.8.61 in der STVA 
Torgau (StAL, BDVP 24/1/956, p. 20). 
44 Brigitte Oleschinski et al, Der Geschlossene Jugendwerkhof Torgau. In: Falk Blask/Gert Geissler (Eds.), 
Einweisung nach Torgau. Texte und Dokumente zur autoritären Jugendfürsorge in der DDR, Berlin 1997, pp. 
93-178, here 121. 
45 Ibid, pp. 121-124. 
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being subjected to interminable interrogations at all times of the day and night. As they 
remembered it, their captors “behaved like the Gestapo in films”, forcing their victims to 
squint into bright lights, while they paced up and down malevolently behind them, sometimes 
coming over to whisper things into their ears, at other times threatening to become physical. 
Some were beaten; others were not; there was never any reason or logic to it. It was just 
something they knew they could get away with.  
 
Several of those who had been on the receiving end of Stasi interrogations remember their 
questioners playing a “good cop, bad cop” game with them. After days of being harangued, 
misinterpreted and misquoted, disorientated by lack of sleep and the unfamiliarity of their 
surroundings, they would be approached by a younger officer who would tell them that he 
believed them.46 Although to the guards and prison administration it appeared completely 
usual and normal, when members of the general public witnessed the punishment meted out 
to young would-be escapers, they were sickened and openly voiced the opinion that those 
involved were as bad as the Nazis. 
 
Am Boden liegend erhielt J. vom VP-Angehörigen M. und F. eine Serie von 
Fußtritten und Fausthieben, bis er, im Gesicht blutend über den Hof bis zu 
dem auf der Strasse wartenden Gefangenentransportfahrzeug geführt wurde. 
Im Hof befanden sich noch 4 weitere VP-Angehörige sodass die Gefahr 
einer erneuten Flucht nicht bestand. 
 
Am Transportfahrzeug wurde J. vom VP-Hwm. M. mit einem Fußtritt ins 
Wageninnere befördert, sodass er dort stolperte. 
                                            
46 Interview with Dieter L. 
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Im Bereich des Grundstückes Elbstrasse 9 hatte sich unterdessen eine etwa 
30 köpfige Menschensammlung gebildet, welche durch Zwischenrufe, wie 
“SS - und Gestapomethoden, wir sind doch nicht mehr bei den Nazis” ihren 
Unwillen zum Ausdruck brachten. 
 
Im Hof des Jugendhauses wurde der Strafgefangene, nachdem er das 
Transportfahrzeug verlassen hatte sofort von Ltn. d. VP S. und dem 
Lehrmeister H. ergriffen und mit Faustschlägen und Fußtritten bis zur 
Gittertür geschlagen. Während dieser Schläge und Tritte war J. mehrfach zu 
Boden gestürzt und wurde auch am Boden liegend getreten und mit Fäusten 
bearbeitet...  Am Gitter zum Verwahrhaus hatte sich eine etwa 30cm große 
Blutflache gebildet... Unter den Zuschauern befanden sich neben mehreren 
VP-Angehörigen auch einige Lehrmeister und Erzieher.47 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the displeasure that such brutal methods aroused among the 
population, the regime repeatedly embraced draconian, “common sense”, knee-jerk solutions 
to the problem of youth nonconformity, which in their language and methodology closely 
resembled tactics previously used (to ill effect) by the National Socialists. 
 
Within local communities, the main responsibility for dealing with youth nonconformity 
fell on the “community policemen” (Abschnittsbevollmächtigte or ABVs).48 The ABVs were 
                                            
47 Sachstandsbericht über die Körperverletzung durch VP-Angehörige des Jugendhauses Torgau, 12.7.1963 
(StAL BDVP 24/1/956, pp. 254-257). 
48 Richard Bessel, Grenzen des Polizeistaates. Polizei und Gesellschaft in der SBZ und frühen DDR, 1945-1953. 
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tasked not only with providing a visible policing presence on the street, but in building up 
information about local gangs, harassing them and moving their members along for minor 
breaches of peace and order.49 
 
Zur Lückenlosen Erfassung aller Personen und Personengruppen, die als 
Gammler in Erscheinung treten oder mit solchen in Verbindung stehen, wird 
vorgesehen... 
 
1. Alle operativen Kräfte haben im Rahmen ihrer Dienstausübung bei dem oben 
bezeichneten Personenkreis Ausweiskontrollen durchzuführen. 
2. Die ABV haben eine Aufstellung über die oben bezeichneten Personen und 
Personengruppen mit Name, Vorname, Geburtstag, Wohnanschrift und Anschrift 
der Arbeitsstelle zu fertigen. 
3. Kraftfahrzeuge, die von oben bezeichneten Personen oder Personengruppen 
benutzt werden und durch ihre äußere Beschaffenheit (Farbe, Aussehen, 
Einrichtung) im Straßenverkehr negativ auffallen, sind anzuhalten und die 
Feststellung der Personalien der Führer solcher Fahrzeuge wie unter 1. 
angewiesen. 
 
In the eyes of many people, the ABVs were not all that dissimilar from the “block wardens” 
(or Blockwärter) employed by the Nazis.50 As the “eyes and ears” of the state, they relied 
                                                                                                                                       
In: Richard Bessel/Ralph Jessen (Eds.), Die Grenzen der Diktatur. Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR, Göttingen 
1996, pp. 224-252, here 240-243. 
49 Vorschläge zur wirksamen Verdrängung verbrecherischer und rowdyhafter Handlungen durch Gammler, 
20.10.1965 (Landesarchiv Berlin, STA Rep. 303/26.1/490 Jugendkriminalität 1964-1966, pp. 159-160). 
50 Hans-Joachim Ehrig, Kontaktbereichsbeamte: wichtiger Mosaikstein eines Systems umfassender polizeilicher 
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heavily on local gossip and hearsay, officially characterised as “reputation (Leumund)”, for 
identifying potential deviants and trouble-makers. 
 
The language and notions used to label and stereotype young people who did not fit into 
the regime’s blueprint for youth often bore a striking resemblance to the language used in the 
Third Reich to describe young people who failed to conform to the norms of the “national 
community”. Like the Nazis before them, the Communists were very worried about “work-
shy” tendencies and “parasitism” among youth. The tendency of young, unskilled workers to 
change jobs frequently in order to increase their wages or independence and to avoid 
employers who did not treat them well, merged for the SED with the skiving of young 
workers who were addicted to alcohol or who had problems ordering and planning their 
lives.51 While at certain periods, the Communist authorities chose to see the latter as people 
suffering from problems, who needed the regime’s help and supervision to overcome them 
and to live healthy and productive lives, at other times it attacked what it saw as the 
deliberate refusal of such “feckless” young people to contribute fully to the project of the 
construction of socialism. During periods when the pendulum had swung back to repression 
and coercion, “work-shy elements” among youth were singled out for special treatment and 
“re-education” in work camps. There, in language highly reminiscent of the ethic of National 
Socialist Concentration Camps, they were to learn the value of hard labour. 
 
Public vilification of young people often used the language of “filth” and “infection”, 
depicting young people as disease-ridden parasites, in one instance with hair eaten away by 
                                                                                                                                       
Kontrolle; ein Vergleich mit dem Blockwart der Nazis und dem Abschnittsbevollmächtigten der DDR-Vopo, 
Berlin 1979 (Initiative gegen das Einheitliche Polizeigesetz, 2nd Edn). 
51 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, p. 162. 
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rats.52 Frequently the negative images created of young people alluded to racial and sexual 
stereotypes. The black origins of jazz and Rock ‘n’ Roll were referred to in comments about 
young people listening to “ape music (Affenmusik)” and wearing “monkey shirts 
(Affenhemden)”.53 Policemen assumed that young men who listened to black music must be a 
threat to women and viewed them as potential rapists. Any girls who willingly associated 
with them must be depraved or diseased. One of the young fashion victims blamed for the 
1953 uprising, for example, was described as having “doubtful girls (zweifelhafte Mädchen)” 
on his arm. Only girls with dubious morals would find his boogie-woogie shirts and his Be-
Bop haircut just right.54 Only dishonourable and ignoble girls could be attracted to such 
contemptible young men. Later in the 1950s, female Rock’n Roll fans were said to believe 
that “die Laufbahn… einer Nutte in Westberlin sei das für sie Geeignete”.55 The exercising of 
freedom in dress and choice of company was equated with pollution and dishonour. 
 
Seeing them as worse than prostitutes, on at least one occasion, girls who danced openly 
with the rocker boys were rounded up and forced to undergo tests for venereal disease. „In 
den letzten Tagen mußten aus den Parkanlagen, vorwiegend vom Musikplatz, 11 weibliche 
Jugendliche zugeführt werden, von denen 5 Mädchen infolge einer Geschlechtskrankheit in 
ärztliche und stationäre Behandlung gebracht werden mußten.“56 Although SED denunciation 
                                            
52 Vogelscheuchen in der Peterstraße. In: Leipziger Volkszeitung, 23.7.58. 
53 Protokoll des Berichtes über die Arbeit im Klubhaus Erich Zeigner am 18.9.1953, 3.2.1954 (StAL 
IV5/01/483). 
54 Diebe, Straßenräuber, Brandstifter – das sind die "Ritter der abendländischen Kultur“. In: Neues Deutschland, 
1.7.1953. 
55 Vogelscheuchen in der Peterstraße. In: Leipziger Volkszeitung, 23.7.58. 
56 Stellungnahme zur Bekämpfung des Rowdytums – Brennpunkt Klara-Zetkin-Park, 24.8.1960 (StAL BDVP 
24/113, pp. 167-175, here 172). 
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of Rock’n Roll as “infectious” and “like a disease” reflects earlier National Socialist 
condemnation of Swing music, it is important to note that even in liberal democracies like 
Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, it was common to describe youth subculture as being “like a 
disease”. “People are somehow ‘infected’ by delinquency, which ‘spreads’ from person to 
person, so one has to ‘cure’ the ‘disease’.”57 
 
MORAL PANICS 
 
Although the methods of conflict and coercion employed by the regime had both Stalinist and 
Nazi overtones, they also contained a novel component, that of the “moral panic”. Stanley 
Cohen coined the term “moral panic” to describe media-induced frenzies in which 
stereotypes and myths were created by the press and projected onto conspicuous groups of 
young nonconformists, so that they became identifiable as modern-day “folk devils”. 
“Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, 
episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values 
and interests; its nature is presented in stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass 
media.”58 
 
Examining the clashes which occurred between the mods and the rockers in English resort 
towns during the early 1960s (immortalized in The Who’s 1979 film, Quadrophenia), Cohen 
analyzed the role of tabloid-style exposés in exaggerating behaviour, attributing causes and 
motives and generally heightening tension. Media reports on youth subculture did a great deal 
                                            
57 Cohen, Folk Devils, p. 62. 
58 Ibid., p. 9; cf. Erich Goode/Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics. The social construction of deviance, Oxford 
1994. 
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to popularize a particular subcultural style, to give it associations and meanings as well as 
creating expectations about the sorts of activities and behaviour which went with the 
particular style of dress or haircut. “Through symbolization, plus other types of exaggeration 
and distortion, images are made much sharper than reality.”59 
 
An initial act of deviance, or normative diversity (for example, in dress) is 
defined as being worthy of attention and is responded to punitively.  The 
deviant or group of deviants is segregated or isolated and this operates to 
alienate them from conventional society. They perceive themselves as more 
deviant, group themselves with others in a similar position, and this leads to 
more deviance.60 
 
In the process, media coverage created a confrontation which would not otherwise have 
existed. In addition, Cohen pointed to the predictive power of the press in creating an 
expectation on the part of both young people and the authorities that, under a given set of 
circumstances, a confrontation would occur. “There is the implicit assumption, present in 
virtually every report, that what had happened was inevitably going to happen again.”61 As 
was frequently the case in the GDR, so too in the West, the media also persistently had the 
urge to uncover shadowy forms of organization lurking behind apparently mindless acts of 
hooliganism. The “indiscriminate persecution, local overreaction and media stereotyping 
                                            
59 Cohen, Folk Devils, p. 43. 
60 Ibid., p. 18. 
61 Ibid., p. 38. 
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suggested a ‘cabalism’, that is, the solidifying of amorphous groups of teenagers into some 
sort of conspiratorial collectivity, which had no concrete existence.”62 
 
In addition to presenting young people as “agents” and “saboteurs”, deviants and people 
who transgressed community norms, the East German press also emphasized their alienness 
and otherness in a similar fashion and language to Western tabloids. Neues Deutschland 
criticized their „verwahrloste, lange, zottlige, dreckige Mähnen, zerlumpte Twist-Hosen. Sie 
stinken zehn Meter gegen den Wind. Denn Waschen haben sie ‘freiheitlich’ aus ihrem 
Sprachschatz gestrichen”.63 As far as young Beat-fans were concerned, the campaign against 
their music, clothing and haircuts represented a deliberate misinterpretation of youth culture 
and an attempt to demonize their behaviour. „Diesen Artikel lehne ich ab.  Er mutet an wie 
ein Sensationsbericht von Springers Achtgroschenjungen aus der ‘Bild’-Zeitung’“, one reader 
complained, „Es wurden in unglaublicher Form Tatsachen mit Lügen und Verleumdungen 
vermischt und damit dem Leser ein verzerrtes und unwahres Bild vorgetäuscht.“64 
 
Reports on youth subculture in East Germany used similar techniques of exaggeration, 
laying stereotype on stereotype until they had created a phenomenon, which bore little 
resemblance to the original. The extraordinary young people then served as folk devils, or 
“visible reminders of what we should not be”. Once type-cast as deviants and rule-breakers, 
they became “disembodied objects, Rorshach blots (sic) onto which reactions are 
                                            
62 Mike Brake, Comparative youth culture: the sociology of youth cultures and youth subcultures in America, 
Britain and Canada, London 1985, p. 64; Cohen, Folks Devils, p. 63. 
63 Die Amateur Gammler. In: Neues Deutschland, 17.10.65. 
64 Analyse der Leserzuschriften zu Problemen der Jugend, Leipzig 26.11.1965 (StAL, SED IV A-2/16/464, p. 
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projected”.65 As in the West, East German reports on youth subculture had a counter-
productive, self-realizing effect in warning of clashes and confrontations, which then duly 
appeared. This was most notable during the run-up to the Beat demonstration in Leipzig in 
October 1965, when young Beat fans reacted angrily to what had been printed about them in 
the press and to official attempts to ban their music. Far from putting young people off a 
particular style, hostile press coverage only served to make it more popular. Negative media 
attention became a self-fulfilling prophecy. When members of a street gang in a village 
twenty miles away from Leipzig read about the Beat demonstration there, they were so 
impressed by the photographs of tattoos (supposed to put young people definitively off Beat) 
that they copied the designs and slogans for their own Do-it-yourself tattoos. 
 
Nach den Zusammenrottungen von Beatanhängern im Oktober 1965 sah ich 
ein Foto in der ‘Leipziger Volkszeitung’ über eine Tätowierung, die sich 
am Körper einer derartigen Person befand. Den Artikel dazu habe ich 
allerdings nicht gelesen. Mir gefiel die Tätowierung, woraus die Worte 
‘USA’, ‘Treue’ und ‘Geld’ hervorgingen, die meiner Einstellung auf Grund 
des Einflusses der Westsender entsprach, und um damit bei anderen 
Jugendlichen Eindruck zu Machen, brachte ich die gleiche Tätowierung 
mittels zweier Nadeln und Ausziehtusche auf dem rechten Unterarm selbst 
an.66 
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Cohen also described the process of “spurious attribution” by which “one incident, type of 
behaviour, or type of person” is associated “to a whole spectrum of problems and 
aberrations”.67 Through the creation of moral panics, the media conveys the message that the 
behaviour is related to a contemporary social malaise. As in the West, so too in the East, a 
number of different “spurious attributions” competed to explain the phenomenon of youth 
subculture. As well as denouncing Beat fans as dirty and dishevelled, promiscuous and work-
shy, the SED also argued that they were abusing the freedoms and opportunities made 
available to them by a generous Party. In spite of the regime’s emphasis on the equality of 
men and women, working and particularly single mothers became favourite targets on whom 
to pin the blame for youth nonconformity.68 
 
The major difference between the creation of moral panics in East and West, however, 
was the fact that, in the East, press and police were parts of the same structure of one-party 
rule. In the West, newspapers engaged in labelling and stereotyping to increase their sales 
figures while magistrates gave “sound-bites” about “long-haired, mentally unstable, petty 
little hoodlums... who can only find courage like rats, in hunting in packs” to increase their 
standing in the local community.69 Western newspapers justified their prurient interest by 
helping to obtain a tougher response for youth subcultural offenders. In East Germany, both 
press coverage and sentencing were very much subordinate to the dictates of the Party. The 
newspapers acted as cheerleaders while the police persecuted and the judiciary passed 
sentence on young people because all three were closely controlled by the SED. In a country 
where the law was bent to the political will, the judiciary lacked independence and 
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29 
 
objectivity, the press was pliant and muzzled, and there was no real local or national 
democracy. In these circumstances, it was much easier for young people to be judged solely 
on their appearance and designated guilty of heinous crimes simply on the basis of spurious 
attributions and associations.70 
 
In their attacks on youth subculture, the East German authorities drew on a range of 
elements drawn from Stalinism, National Socialist notions of national community, together 
with prevailing, contemporary, international trends for castigating and misrepresenting youth 
as a threat to themselves and to society. But there was always a special added touch which 
differentiated East German repressiveness from other types of repression – that peculiar blend 
of pathos, cynicism and naivety that could make it seem like a good idea to call the wall 
imprisoning the population an “antifascist protection barrier” or to hold military manoeuvres 
on the site of the Buchenwald concentration camp. In October 1965, representatives of the 
armies of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union met to pay their respects to 
the brave antifascists and the victims of Nazism. But they were also determined to 
demonstrate their readiness to use force against the enemies of socialism.71  In a speech 
marking the contribution of the People’s Police to the manoeuvres, Comrade Major General 
Dahl, the Leipzig Chief of Police, spoke of how they had found work for the criminal and 
work-shy elements who had protested against the ban on Beat: 
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Wir haben in den letzten Tagen Jugendliche, die von der Vorbereitung der 
Jugendweihe zurückgekommen sind, die überfallen worden sind, 
ausgeraubt, belästigt und junge Mädchen wirklich unsittlich angefaßt 
worden sind... 
Die Gammler hatten bei sich: Pistolen, feststehende Messer, Schlagringe, 
usw. 
 
Wir hatten sie untersuchen lassen und es hat sich gezeigt, daß eben viele 
Gammler - und das kann niemals unsere Jugend sein und daß kann niemals 
ein Idol der fleißigen Jugend sein - derart schmutzig und dreckig waren, 
daß wir sie erst waschen und ihnen die Haare verschnitten werden mußten. 
Wir mußten erst einmal die Ärzte holen, weil wir festgestellt hatten, daß 
verschieden geschlechtskrank waren. 
Mit diesen Elementen Schluß zu machen, ist auch die Aufgabe der 
Volkspolizei... 
 
Sie glaubten, daß sie die Clubhäuser oder die Tanzgaststätten unserer 
jungen Menschen dazu benutzen können, um dort auf ihre Weise das 
Mobiliar zu zerschlagen und einiges mehr. Wir haben dafür gesorgt, daß 
wir sehr schnell Ordnung und Sauberkeit in unserer Stadt haben und wir 
werden das auch gemeinsam mit der Bevölkerung unserer Stadt 
durchsetzen zum Ruhme unserer Stadt und damit man davon sprechen 
kann: Jawohl, in Leipzig wohnt es sich sehr ordentlich, gut und ruhig!72 
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All the participants in the Beat demonstration were smeared with sexual contagion as well as 
ideological infection. The notion of respectability was used to persecute an embarrassing and 
troublesome minority. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The SED was aware that many of its problems in controlling young people stemmed from the 
conditions they had grown up in in the aftermath of the war. As Erich Honecker put it: 
 
Wir haben einige Jugendlichen, die in zerrütteten Familien der 
Nachkriegszeit aufwuchsen, die den Abschluß der 8. Klasse nicht 
erreichten, die keine ordentliche Lehre aufnehmen konnten, die von der 
sozialistischen Jugendorganisation kaum betreut wurden, die kaum Erfolge 
in ihrer Arbeit hatten, die sogar der Arbeit fernbleiben und schließlich auf 
die schiefe Bahn gerieten. Solche junge Menschen sind der 
imperialistischen Sexual- und Kriminalpropaganda gegenüber besonders 
anfällig.73 
 
Nevertheless, steeped as they were in antifascist myth, in which only the Communists had 
bravely stood up to National Socialism, SED leaders were able to see youth subcultural 
nonconformists as “fascist spawn”.74 Not only were they unsympathetic to the plight of many 
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of these supposed delinquents, but they were prepared to imprison them and eradicate their 
culture – “Die Keime der Bösen auszurotten, welcher Wind auch immer sie uns bringe” – 
with a clear conscience.75 Young people had once been presented as the great hope for the 
future because they were the one section of German society (aside from the Party leadership) 
untainted by National Socialism. However, in the Winter of 1965, young people’s privileged, 
untainted position in relation to the past was revoked and taken away from them. They were 
no longer seen as safer, but as more dangerous because they lacked direct exposure to 
Nazism.76 
 
For historians, the abuse of young Christians demonstrates the way in which any minority, 
however morally upstanding, could be targeted for persecution by a dangerous and illiberal 
regime. The examples provided by the subcultures suggest a more morally ambiguous 
situation. Interest in music, fashionable clothing and dancing often overlapped with 
aggressive defence of territory and engagement in delinquent activities. Members of the 
subcultures were prone to drinking and violence; they could become involved in minor 
criminal activity for kicks. Their basic outlook was little different from British subcultural 
groups like the mods and the rockers, singled out as “folk devils” during a mass-mediated 
moral panic. The authorities in East and West exhibited similar knee-jerk authoritarian 
responses, but although British magistrates manifested overt hostility to delinquents and 
sought to impose deterrent sentences, they remained constrained by a system operating 
according to the rule of law. As a result, in spite of headline-grabbing hyperbole, the violence 
of their response remained largely symbolic. The East German authorities, although not on 
the same moral plane as the genocidal Nazi regime, were less constrained by legal niceties 
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than their counterparts in the West. They could deploy the “short sharp shocks” envied by the 
readers of western tabloids while vilifying nonconformists using conservative language. In 
many ways, the attack on the Beat subculture, whose members dared to challenge the official 
monopoly on cultural expression, was an exercise in scapegoating. The regime’s economic 
reforms were failing and writers and other artists were growing restive with the restrictions 
on their work. By condemning the Beat fans, the regime could abruptly end its reform period, 
turn back to repression and engineer a generational conflict – in the process fostering the 
population’s hostility to the Beatles fans, whose long hair now obscured their vision into the 
future.77 Youth was just a pawn in the wider game of the cold war. 
 
                                            
77 Agde (Ed.), Kahlschlag. 
